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Law as Power
Two Rule of Law Requirements*
Bruno Celano
1. Introduction
“Law as power” is a somewhat neglected topic in contemporary analytical jurispru-
dence. To be sure, attention has been paid, from Hart (and Kelsen) onwards, to
normative legal powers (i.e. norm-creating and norm-applying powers, instituted
by legal power-conferring norms). “Brute” social power, however, and law’s relation
to it, are, in post-Hartian jurisprudence, largely ignored.1
This will be my topic in this chapter. I shall discuss, that is, the way the law
operates as a mode of the exercise of social power. I approach the issue from a
speciﬁc angle (section 2). The subject of my inquiry is the shape social power takes
when the rule of the law is envisaged as an ethico-political ideal. I discuss, that is,
the Rule of Law as a speciﬁc mode of the exercise of social power, and what is
valuable in it (a preliminary characterization will be offered in section 3).
I concentrate on two Rule of Law requirements, consistency (roughly, the
avoidance of conﬂicts) and compliability (roughly, conformity to the principle
“ought” implies “can” ) (section 4). These two desiderata contribute, I argue, to
deﬁning a distinctive mode of social power, one that is characterized by its showing
at least a minimum of respect for the dignity of its subjects. As we shall see, power
can be effectively exercised by systematically ﬂouting these two desiderata. Entire
power structures may ﬂourish around vast areas of inconsistent or non-compliable
directives. Consistency and compliability are required, however, if the laws are to
treat their subjects as autonomous, responsible agents (sections 4, 5). Under both
* I wish to thank Francesca Poggi and Stefan Sciaraffa for their comments on an earlier version of this
chapter.
1 Hart (1961: ch. 4) rightly criticized the view that the law should be understood as the gunman
situation writ large—thus, he rejected Austin’s concept of the sovereign as the source of all legal rules—
as naive and simplistic. Nothing comparable, however, was put in its place. Law’s foundations are seen
in the practices of the club of ofﬁcials. Brute social power—the role of law as a cog in the workings of
social powers—is, in a way, Hart’s blind spot. (I have argued for this claim in Celano (2012). Nothing
in the argument of this chapter depends on the correctness of this assessment of Hart’s jurisprudence.)
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respects, it turns out (section 6), power exercised through the Rule of Law qualiﬁes
as public, rational, and non-paternalistic.
2. Social power through the lens of the Rule of Law
Law’s standing vis-à-vis social power is a central issue in legal theory—witness the
works of Weber, Kelsen, Ross, and, in Italy, N. Bobbio. Not to mention, of course,
Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, or Marx.
One obvious way of approaching the subject is by investigating the relations
between law and coercion, and the different ways in which law may be coercive.
One does not have to endorse the (implausible) view that coercion is the differentia
of law as contrasted with other kinds of social order,2 nor the claim that coercion is
an essential feature of law, in order to grasp the signiﬁcance of this connection—law
operating as a means of social power through its being coercive. Even if we grant
that coercion is not a necessary feature of law, it would be wrong, I think, to deny
jurisprudence the task of clarifying the issue. For this to be a legitimate task for
(general) jurisprudence it is sufﬁcient, I think, that typically (epi to polu) law is
coercive.3
Be that as it may, my focus is not, in this chapter, on the coerciveness of the law.
What I am interested in, is law understood as a distinctive mode of the exercise of
social power. This evokes grand sociological generalizations—e.g. the law as one of
the manifestations of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force; law as an instrument
of ideological hegemony, or social oppression; the law as the organization of force in
society, involving the institutionalization of the use and the threat of physical force.
I am going to approach the issue, however, from a different angle.
The object of this chapter is the shape social power takes when the rule of the law
is envisaged as an ethico-political ideal. By “the rule of the law as an ethico-political
ideal” I mean what is usually called “the Rule of Law” (RoL, for short). I understand
the RoL in the formal, “thin,” sense,4 which has now become usual among
jurisprudents. So understood, the RoL comprises a loose cluster of (1) formal
features of the laws (prospectivity, publicity, relative generality, relative stability,
intelligibility and relative clarity, compliability, consistency), plus (2) institutional
and procedural desiderata (such as, for instance, that the making of individual
norms, applying to individual cases, be guided by general rules).5 The RoL will be
the lens through which I will look at my subject. I shall consider the RoL, in the
speciﬁed sense, as a distinctive mode of the exercise of social power.
2 Kelsen (1945: part I, ch. 1). 3 Cf. Schauer (2010). 4 Tamanaha (2004: 91).
5 For a list of these institutional and procedural requirements see e.g. Raz (1979: 215–18): “the
making of particular laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general
rules;” “the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;” “the courts should have review powers
over the implementation of the other principles;” “the courts should be easily accessible;” “the
discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.” For similar
lists of the RoL requirements, see Fuller (1969: ch. 2); Finnis (1980: 270–1); Marmor (2004: 5ff.);
Kramer (2007: ch. 2).
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Before we start, two clariﬁcations are in order. (1) My concern is, ﬁrst, with what
the RoL, regarded as a distinctive mode of social power, is—what its main features
are. And, second, with what is valuable in it: what the values are that this kind of
power serves, and how. (Under this respect, mine will be a substantive ethico-
political inquiry.) I sidestep the issue of whether the concept of law entails the idea
of the RoL, or perhaps some minimal version of it. The answer to this question is,
to my present purposes, immaterial. (2) The subject of this chapter is the law as a
vehicle of “social power,” or of “brute” power (as contrasted with legal normative
powers; see section 1). What should be meant by these terms?
Power is, of course, a puzzling, highly problematic notion. The word is poly-
semic. According to some,6 the concept of power—power in society—is an
essentially contested concept. In what follows, I shall rely on an intuitive under-
standing of what social power is, what kinds of social relationships do qualify as
power relationships, and so on. There are, in fact, accounts of social power which
impose very stringent conditions on the applicability of the notion. According to
some such austere accounts, some of the “varieties of power” that I shall mention
may not qualify as forms of power at all. A fully-ﬂedged deployment of my
argument would require a fully developed account of this notion. As I said,
I shall not attempt this here. I rely on an intuitive idea, no doubt vague, imprecise,
generic, of what power relations in society are, and of their varieties. Thus,
I stipulate, very roughly, that “social power” consists, basically, in this: someone
exercises a measure of control over someone else’s behavior, thought, or feeling, in
the pursuit of his ends or interests (which may include controlling someone else’s
behavior, thought, or feeling). My hope is that the legitimacy of this intuitive,
unreﬁned notion, and of the characterization of the phenomena we shall encounter
as varieties of “power”, will be apparent.
Thus, the concept of social power will remain unanalyzed. It will be used as a
primitive. A word, however, is needed about the characterization of the family of
power relations I shall discuss as forms of “brute” social power. In this context,
“bruteness” is to be understood as relative:7 the relevant forms of power may be said
to be “brute” relative to the layer of normative powers (powers to create and apply
norms) instituted by legal power-conferring rules. This does not mean that they
may not be complex or institutionalized phenomena in their own right, relative to
further, more basic kinds of facts.
3. Rule of Law power: a preliminary characterization
Laws meeting RoL requirements may have almost any content. What is peculiar, as
regards the RoL, is, however, the form that the exercise of power takes. The RoL is,
in the ﬁrst instance, a speciﬁc mode of the exercise of power.
6 Lukes (2005). 7 Anscombe (1958).
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It is not at all unusual to understand the RoL as a speciﬁc mode of the exercise of
power, in particular, political power. In order to grasp its speciﬁcity we have to
consider what other modes of the exercise of power, political and generally social, it
should be contrasted with.
As a speciﬁc mode of power the RoL is usually contrasted with “managerial
governance or rule by decree.”8 Or it is contrasted with “arbitrary” power, meaning
by this either power not exercised in conformity with the rules it should conform
to;9 or public power exercised in the pursuit of private interests.10 It is also often
contrasted with “manipulation,” or forms of “manipulative” power.11
I take my cue from this last suggestion. RoL power will be contrasted, in what
follows, with varieties of “manipulative” power.
“Manipulation” is a generic, vague, and ambiguous word, carrying evaluative and
strong emotive connotations. In order to render the contrast between RoL power and
“manipulative” varieties of power meaningful, and illuminating, we have to make its
meaning determinate. I propose to do this by stipulating two conditions, which our
account of RoL power—and, by contrast, of the “manipulative” varieties of power it
is, ex hypothesi, opposed to—will have to satisfy. The ﬁrst condition concerns the
descriptive import of the word. The second concerns its evaluative implications.
(1) “Manipulation” evokes the idea of treating human beings as things, to be
modiﬁed, altered, etc. as one sees ﬁt, irrespective of their beliefs, attitudes, or will.
Conversely, a non-manipulative form of power (e.g. the RoL) will have to be
understood as characterized by the treatment of its subjects as sources of deliber-
ation, capable of making choices in the light of their beliefs and attitudes, and of
acting on the basis of these choices.
Admittedly, this does not say much, and can easily be shown to be insufﬁcient.
(So, for instance, when X makes Y do A by relying on Y’s belief that in circum-
stances C one ought to do A, and by deceiving Y so that he mistakenly believes
that circumstances C do in fact obtain, isn’t X “manipulating” Y’s behavior?12)
But it will be enough as a preliminary characterization. We shall make it more
determinate as we go on.
(2) “Manipulation” is, presumably, power which does not respect the dignity of
its subjects.
It is a widely held opinion that the RoL is a mode of power characterized by
(a minimum of) respect for the dignity of human beings, or at least that “observance
of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity.13 Our account
will have to explain in what sense this is so, and why.
8 Waldron (2008a: 78). 9 Bobbio (1999: 182–3). 10 Raz (1979: 219–20).
11 Fuller (1969: 163–7), and, on Fuller’s views thereabout, Waldron (2008b: 17); Raz (1979: 221);
Finnis (1980: 273); Kramer (2007: 184). The RoL is famously contrasted with “the rule of men.” An
understanding of this Protean contrast, however, is—barring rhetorical formulae—the end, rather than
the beginning, of theorizing.
12 Cf. Raz (1979: 221).
13 Raz (1979: 221). That the point of (many of) the RoL requirements is to make possible, inter
alia, (certain forms of) respect for human dignity, is common ground. Cf. Fuller (1969: 162–3); Finnis
(1980: 272–3); MacCormick (1985: 26); Marmor (2004: 21, 32); Waldron (2008a: 76).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/2/2013, SPi
132 Bruno Celano
The ﬁrst condition gives us the beginning of the required explanation. Presum-
ably, “manipulative” power does not respect the dignity of its subjects because
it treats them as things. This, however, is only the beginning of an explanation.
We have to show in what ways subjects, under the RoL, are not treated as things,
and how—and to what extent—these contribute to an attitude of respect for the
dignity of human beings.
So, RoL power will have to be understood, in contrast with “manipulative”
forms of power, as power that, ﬁrst, treats subjects as centers of deliberation and
that, second, in so doing (pro tanto) respects their dignity as human beings. I try to
show that this is so, and why, by focusing on two RoL requirements, consistency
and compliability.
4. Two Rule of Law requirements
How does law’s conformity to these two requirements contribute to deﬁning
a distinctive mode of social power—one that is not “manipulative,” and thus
(pro tanto) respects the dignity of those over whom it is exerted?
The conception of the RoL adopted here (section 2) is mainly instrumental.
(Fuller’s tale concerning the different ways in which Rex may fail in his enterprise
aptly illustrates this kind of approach.14) The RoL is understood, basically, as
comprising what is instrumentally necessary in order to achieve a certain goal.
Which goal? A ﬁrst, approximate answer is: guiding human behavior. So, for
instance, directives typically have to be prospective, and intelligible (prospectivity
and intelligibility are, as we have seen, two among the various RoL desiderata), if
they are to be capable of guiding human behavior.
This is, however, generic and imprecise. There are many ways of guiding (taking
the word “guide” at its face value) human behavior. Most of the requirements of the
RoL (in particular, those in the ﬁrst group; section 2) specify, more or less directly,
what is instrumentally required in order to achieve the end of guiding human
behavior through rules.15
These two ends—“guiding human behavior,” generally, and “subjecting human
behavior to the guidance of rules”—are different. The latter is a speciﬁcation of the
former: subjecting human behavior to the guidance of rules is a speciﬁc way of
guiding it. As we shall see, the difference between these two goals is crucial in
explaining how RoL power satisﬁes the two conditions set out in the preceding
section (not treating subjects as things and, to this extent, respecting human
dignity).
What is involved, then, in “subjecting human behavior to the guidance of rules,”
as the proper end which accounts for RoL desiderata? One obvious ingredient is
generality: the word “rule” designates, we may assume, a general directive. But this
14 Fuller (1969: 33–8).
15 In Fuller’s phrase, “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”
(1969: 106).
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is only part of the answer. By focusing on consistency and compliability, rather than
generality, I mean to explain further facets of what is involved in the idea of
subjecting human behavior to the guidance of rules, in its difference from the
idea of guidance, as such.
In other words. “Subjecting human behavior to the guidance of rules” is the basic
purpose grounding, in its main outlines, the RoL. In order to understand what the
RoL is, and what it requires, we have to get this purpose right. What is involved in
it, in addition to the idea of guidance through general directives, and what follows
from this? Focusing on the two requirements, consistency and compliability, is a
way of answering this question.
In understanding what the end which explains RoL desiderata is, and how it
differs from that of guiding (without speciﬁcation) behavior, the crucial point is
what may be termed “normal,” or standard, guidance: that is, guidance through an
understanding, by the subject, of what the law, according to its tenor, requires of
him, and that it is required of him. The RoL comprises a set of conditions which
have to be satisﬁed for the normal, standard guidance (so deﬁned) of human
behavior.
The simplest case is given by the idea of “telling people what they should do”
(and, maybe, threatening them of unpleasant consequences in case of non-compli-
ance). When X tells Y to do A, typically, X tries to guide Y’s behavior in the
direction of doing A through the understanding, by Y, of what is required of him
(namely, doing A), and that it is required of him. This is the standard case. All sorts
of non-standard cases—non-standard forms of guidance—can be devised,16 as will
be borne out by our examination of the requirements of consistency and complia-
bility (below, in this section, and in section 5). In accounting for RoL desiderata,
and for their point, the general form of the explanation will have to be, in outline: it
is necessary, in order for the laws to achieve their standard purpose—guiding
human behavior, according to their tenor, through their being understood by
their subjects—that they satisfy condition C, for such-and-such reasons.
So, the task is to show why consistency and compliability are instrumentally
necessary for standard guidance, and what follows from this. We have to ask
ourselves, ﬁrst, what kinds of power may be served by the systematic violation of
these two requirements, and, second, in what ways these may turn out to be
“manipulative” in character, and thus prove disrespectful of the dignity of those
who are subject to them.
In answering these two questions, I shall work with a simpliﬁed model of the
RoL. I regard the RoL as an ethico-political ideal concerning the relations between
a lawgiver (in the widest sense) who issues prescriptions and those who are
subject to these prescriptions17—an ideal, then, concerning the shape prescriptive
16 A simple case of non-standard guidance: parents may sometimes, in order to make their young
children do A, tell them not to do A, relying on their children’s standing disposition to do the opposite
of what they tell them to do.
17 “Prescriptions are given or issued by someone. They ‘ﬂow’ from or have their ‘source’ in the will
of a norm-giver . . . They are, moreover, addressed at some agent or agents, whom we shall call
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relationships (i.e. the kind of relationship which comes into being, by virtue of the
happy issuing of a prescription, between a lawgiver, on the one hand, and those
to whom her prescription is addressed, on the other hand) should take. How to
transpose this model to a more complex reality (some legal norms, we may plausibly
assume, are not prescriptions) is, admittedly, a problem.18
This is a “legislative” conception of the RoL. At least prima facie (but see in this
section, sub (2)) legislating plainly is the issuing of prescriptions. So understood,
then, the RoL is the rule of legislation. What follows concerns only this version
of the RoL.
My justiﬁcation for adopting this model (apart from the gains of simplicity) is
twofold.
(1) In the jurisprudential tradition from which the conception of the RoL
adopted here (“thin” RoL; section 2) stems, the RoL is, in fact usually
understood along these lines (witness, for example, Lon Fuller’s tale of
Rex, which is the matrix of these theorizations),19 as a matter of the
conditions enacted directives have to meet if the purpose intended by
those who have enacted them is to be achieved.
(2) In contemporary legal systems, the role of legislation is paramount. “Legis-
lative” RoL captures at least a very important layer of the idea of the
RoL. True, the apparently obvious claim that legislation is the issuing of
prescriptions—that, then, statutes are prescriptions—is by no means apro-
blematic. Legislation proper, as it occurs in developed legal systems, has
many complex, articulated procedural and institutional features, which have
no obvious equivalent in the case of simple acts of prescribing.20 Most
important, there is no obvious way in which a multi-membered legislature,
composed by individuals and groups who sharply disagree with each other
on the relevant issues, and making decisions on the basis of majority rule,
may be assimilated to an individual, enacting his own will by expressing it
in the form of a prescription.21 These difﬁculties notwithstanding, it seems
to me, the model—a “prescriptive” understanding of the RoL—remains
norm-subject(s).” Von Wright (1963: 7). Further features which Von Wright sees as “characteristic of
norms which are prescriptions” are of no interest for us here.
18 In order to make room for power-conferring rules (and, especially, for rules conferring to private
individuals the power to achieve some ends of theirs: “If you wish to do this, this is the way to do it”
(Hart (1961: 28)), we should understand “prescribing” as including cases of telling people how to pursue
the goals they want to achieve (or telling people how to do what they want to do). Cf. Raz (1979: 215):
“power-conferring rules are designed to guide behavior.” Prescribing, so understood, covers both the
issuing of mandatory directives and the issuing of power-conferring rules. In allowing in the text for the
possibility that some legal norms are not prescriptions, I have in mind (not, power-conferring rules,
but) norms that, at least apparently, are not “issued” by any “lawgiver.” This topic will not be further
discussed here. “Prescriptive” RoL at least captures, I shall assume, one facet of the RoL.
19 Waldron (2007: 109–10) rightly observes that Fuller’s treatment of the subject in Fuller (1969:
ch. 2) “illustrates a strong . . . tendency to associate the rule of law with formal features of legislation, as
opposed to other modes of law and law-making.”
20 MacCormick (1973: 114–15).
21 Waldron (1999a: part I) and (1999b: 26–8).
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illuminating, especially insofar as the RoL is envisaged—as it, in fact, usually
is—as an ethico-political ideal concerning the relations between those who
govern and the governed, between rulers and ruled. Pondering the formal
features of prescriptions remains, it seems to me, the ﬁrst step in understand-
ing the nature of legislation (I shall not defend this view here; the reader may
take it as an axiom).22
Thus, RoL requirements (in particular, those in the ﬁrst group, section 2) will be
understood as features prescriptions have to exhibit if they are to be capable of
achieving, and of achieving well, the purpose of standard guidance of the behavior
of their addressees. Prescribing is a form—a paradigmatic form—of “telling people
what they should do.”23 Thus, standard guidance is the typical, normal purpose of
the activity of prescribing—it may be termed its constitutive purpose. The practice
(or the “institution”) of prescribing would not exist, standard and non-standard
cases alike, were it not commonly and (usually) rightly assumed, when prescriptions
are issued, that they aim at standard guidance.
RoL desiderata (those in the ﬁrst group), then, will be features that prescriptions
typically exhibit, and conditions prescriptions normally meet, in varying degrees.
The possibility of non-standard prescriptions is not ruled out. In particular, as we
shall see in a minute, abuses are possible: people can exploit the opportunity of
issuing prescriptions—they can make a strategic use of the institution of prescrib-
ing—in order to pursue in deviant, indirect ways, non-standard, undisclosed
purposes.
So, what kinds of power may be served by the issuing of prescriptions that
systematically violate either of our two requirements, and in what ways may such
legislation be “manipulative” of those who are subject to it, and not respect their
dignity?
Imagine a power relation of the following kind: the lawgiver does not intend
the addressee to do what he prescribes him to do. On the contrary, he often
issues inconsistent or non-compliable prescriptions (e.g. by commanding actions,
or omissions, which run counter to the most deeply ingrained inclinations of
the vast majority of human beings). What the lawgiver intends, is precisely that
the addressee should fail to comply, and, as a consequence, develop a sense of
puzzlement, fear, anxiety, or a strong feeling of guilt. Thanks to that, it will be easy,
then, to make the addressee do, by further means, what the lawgiver actually wants
him to do.
This is, I submit, a paradigm of a power structure that works through the
manipulation of subjects. I shall now try to unpack what is implied in this minimal
Gedankenexperiment. In so doing, by contrast, the main features of RoL power will
22 As is well known, arguments against a “prescriptive model” of governance through law are legion.
Cf. Hart (1961: 20–2); Hurd (1990).
23 “Telling” people what they should do, as I mean it here, refers to cases of issuing prescriptions,
not to “detached” statements of what the subject should do according to a given set of prescriptions.
Raz (1979: 153–7).
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emerge—and it will be apparent in what sense, and why, the RoL meets the two
conditions laid out in section 3.24
4.1. Consistency
I begin with some assumptions concerning the notion of “inconsistent” prescrip-
tions, and how purported logical relations between prescriptions should be under-
stood. These will be the conceptual tools to be employed in the inquiries that
follow. These assumptions will be merely stated, here. Their defense is deferred to
another occasion.
By “inconsistency” (between prescriptions) I mean three kinds of cases: (1)
conﬂicts proper (one and the same action A is both obligatory and forbidden:
OA & FA); (2) contradictions (it is both obligatory that A and permitted that not
A; or, A is both forbidden and permitted);25 (3) cases where two conditional
directives, referring, respectively, to the condition that p and the condition that
q, reconnect to these conditions either conﬂicting or contradictory deontic conse-
quences (as deﬁned in cases (1) and (2)), and, further, p and q jointly occur (it is left
open the possibility that p and q are one and the same condition; when this is so,
trivially, when the one occurs the other also necessarily occurs). In the ﬁrst case, and
the corresponding case in the third group, whatever one does is wrong (these are
dilemmatic situations). In all cases, the relevant prescriptions cannot both be
obeyed or satisﬁed.26 This marks a difference between statements of fact (or,
propositions), on the one hand, and prescriptions, on the other hand. Statements
of fact (or propositions) may be true or false; that two statements of fact (or
propositions) are inconsistent means that there is no possible world in which
they are both true. Prescriptions are neither true nor false. That two prescriptions
are inconsistent means that there is no possible world in which they are both
followed or satisﬁed (with one qualiﬁcation, to be spelt out soon).
The ﬁrst of our two RoL desiderata requires the avoidance of inconsistencies.
Why? Inconsistent prescriptions (on any plausible account of the existence condi-
tions of prescriptions), or the issuing of such prescriptions, are not a logical
impossibility. A world in which prescriptions which cannot both be obeyed or
24 RoL requirements interact, and they work together in enabling the achievement of the purpose
and values the RoL serves. Consistency and compliability are not—neither separately, nor jointly—
sufﬁcient conditions. So, the argument is not that when the laws are consistent, and it is possible to
comply with them, then they satisfy the two conditions laid out in section 3. Rather, an understanding
of the point, and import, of the two desiderata illustrates what the nature of RoL power is. Analogous
arguments could be developed, mutatis mutandis, with regard to other RoL desiderata.
25 I assume, following one usual approach in deontic logic, that OA entails PA (i.e. A is permitted),
and, correspondingly, that FA entails that ¬A is permitted. So understood, the conceptual relations
between the operators “obligatory,” “forbidden,” and “permitted” mirror those holding between the
alethic modalities “necessary,” “impossible,” and “possible.” Cf. von Wright (1951: 1–3) and (1968:
142–3).
26 I stipulate—following vonWright (1983: 139); but cf. also Hart (1982: 116)—that a permission
is satisﬁed when its subject(s) at least sometimes avail themselves of the permission—i.e. they, at least
sometimes, perform the permitted action. This seems fair to what may be taken to be the point of
permissive norms.
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satisﬁed exist, or are issued, is a possible world (as opposed to a world in which
some of the propositions which are true in it are not true). Purported “logical”
relations between prescriptions, I assume,27 mirror the logical relations proper
holding between their respective obedience- or satisfaction-statements (meaning,
by this, statements of fact, or propositions, describing the actions which satisfy the
relevant prescriptions). Speciﬁcally, two prescriptions are inconsistent if and only if
their respective obedience- or satisfaction-statements are inconsistent.28
But why should we single out, as a separate class, those relations between
prescriptions that track the logical relations (for example, inconsistency) holding
between their respective obedience- or satisfaction-statements? Granted, “logical”
relations between prescriptions mirror logical relations between their respective
obedience- or satisfaction-statements. But why do they matter? Why is it important
to single out, in the form of principles of a purported “logic” of prescriptions, the
conditions under which sets of prescriptions are, by logical necessity, jointly
satisﬁable? Why is it important to single out the class of those prescriptions—
inconsistent prescriptions—which cannot (logically) jointly be satisﬁed?
The answer is, I think, this:29 purported logical principles governing prescriptive
discourse have to be understood as criteria of rational law-giving (i.e. as principles a
rational law-giving will should conform to), under one crucial assumption: whoever
prescribes X to do A wants X to do A. It is under this assumption that the
conditions under which sets of prescriptions can (logically can) be jointly satisﬁed
provide criteria of rational law-giving. A rational lawgiver cannot want what is
(what she believes to be) logically impossible to be the case. This is why the issuing
of inconsistent prescriptions may normally be deemed irrational.
The relevant assumption is, then, that the lawgiver wants the addressee to do
what she tells him to do;30 and, further, she intends, by uttering the prescription, to
make him perform the action. This assumption is crucial, for this reason: it is by
virtue of this assumption that, in general, the issuing of prescriptions becomes
possible. Understanding an utterance as a prescription involves the (defeasible)
ascription, to the utterer, of the assumed intention: the lawgiver wants that the
subject perform the prescribed action; and he intends, by prescribing it, to make
her perform the action.
This is what I shall call “normal,” or “standard” legislative intention.31 Normal
legislative intention is the intention to pursue a prescription’s constitutive purpose,
27 Following vonWright (1983), (1984), (1985); but cf. also Hart (1982: 116) and (1983: 325–7).
28 This does not apply to pairs of permissions: that the satisfaction-statements of two permissions
are logically inconsistent does not entail that they conﬂict (PA and P¬A are not inconsistent). Hart
(1983: 327). The need for this—logically untidy—qualiﬁcation is a consequence of the stipulation in n. 26.
29 Cf. von Wright (1983: esp. at 132, 141–2, 149); (1984: 452–3, 456); (1985: 271). Cf. also
Fuller (1969: 66); Hart (1982: 116); Alchourrón and Bulygin (1984: 458); Celano (1990: 268–82).
30 VonWright (1963: 7, 119); (1983: I, 8). Cf. also MacCormick (1973: 104–5); Hart (1982: 247,
249); Celano (1990: 127).
31 The intentional structure constitutive of prescriptions is, in fact, more complex than this. The
workings of a prescription rest, typically, on a set of nested, self-reﬂexive intentions. Grice (1957);
Strawson (1964: 256–7); Schiffer (1988: 19); Celano (1990: 127–51, 205–13, and 2010: section 6).
Cf. also Raz (1996: 283). Typically, the lawgiver has (1) the intention to make the addressee perform a
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namely, standard guidance (section 4). Non-standard legislative intentions are
possible. Prescriptions can be insincere.32 Ascription to a lawgiver of a normal
legislative intention is a defeasible presumption. It is, however, standardly true;
and an explicit denial of this condition (“I hereby order you to do A, but I don’t
care whether you do it or not”) would prevent a prescription from coming
into existence. The institution of prescribing would not exist, standard and non-
standard cases alike, were it not commonly and (usually) rightly assumed, when
prescriptions are issued, that the lawgiver wants that the subject perform the
prescribed action, and he wants, by prescribing her to perform it, to make her
perform the action.
Prescriptive inconsistency, then, is no logical impossibility. Its avoidance is,
rather, a matter of rational law-giving. “Rational” in what sense? Instrumentally
rational, relating to a certain goal: standard guidance, i.e. guiding the behavior of
subjects in the prescribed direction—making the subject perform the prescribed
action—through their understanding of this.
So, the existence of jointly non-satisﬁable prescriptions is a logical possibility; the
issuing of inconsistent prescriptions is possible. And—what is crucial to our present
purposes—it may well be instrumentally rational, in the pursuit of non-standard
legislative goals. Possible reasons—i.e. non-standard legislative intentions—are the
following. (I take as paradigmatic those cases where whatever one does is wrong; the
items in this list may be weakened or qualiﬁed in order to account for the other
possibilities.)
(1) The lawgiver may wish to induce in the subject a state of puzzlement (“What
on earth is required of me?”), of frustration, anxiety, a sense of being “entrapped,”33
a nervous breakdown,34 or cognitive dissonance.35 (2) He may want to have a
(purported) reason for punishing her anyway. (3) He may want to induce fear, or
terrorize her. (4) He may have the purpose of humiliating her, or (5) of inducing
feelings of guilt.
These are all non-standard legislative intentions (the list has no pretension of
being exhaustive) which may render instrumentally rational the issuing of inconsist-
ent prescriptions. They all identify cases of abuse of the institution of prescribing:36
speciﬁcally, the lawgiver exploits—i.e. makes a strategic use of—the form of
certain action; (2) he intends to make the addressee perform the action as a consequence of his uttering
a sentence; and (3) he intends to make the addressee perform the action (as a consequence of his
uttering a sentence) by virtue of the recognition, by the addressee, of these very same intentions, (1) to
(3). There is, however, no need for us to follow these complications here.
32 Austin (1962: 16); Searle (1969: 60, 64ff.); MacCormick (1973: 105); Hart (1982: 249).
33 Cf. Raz (1979: 222).
34 Fuller (1969: 66).
35 A lawgiver issuing inconsistent prescriptions may want to put the subject in a conﬂict situation;
and, through the latter, to engender cognitive dissonance. Festinger (1962: 39–40) distinguishes
between conﬂict (in a choice situation) and dissonance (in a post-choice situation, following the choice
of one of the conﬂicting options). In conﬂict, one is pushed (by the conﬂicting reasons for and against
conﬂicting options) in opposite directions. When dissonance occurs, after the choice, one is pushed in
one single direction, toward the reduction of dissonance.
36 Cf. Austin (1962: 16); Hart (1982: 247).
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prescriptive discourse in order to bring about a result different from, and irreducible
to, standard guidance.37
Now, it is important to realize that robust power structures, having a ﬁrm hold
on their subjects, may in fact come into being and prosper—in families, work-
places, churches, associations of various sorts—around the issuing of inconsistent
prescriptions, and through it.38 Flouting the consistency requirement may be a
perfectly rational way of engendering puzzlement, frustration, fear, guilt, etc., thus
rendering the subjects malleable to the lawgiver’s will.
Power structures that operate in this way. I submit, may well be characterized, in
a straightforwardly intelligible sense, as of a “manipulative” kind (our ﬁrst condi-
tion, section 3). The non-standard modes of control on our list are ways of forcing
the subject in an artiﬁcially created quandary, of inducing in her unpleasant feelings
or emotions, or a contrived experience of uneasiness, and to capitalize on this.
These are ways of, metaphorically, treating subjects as things to be modiﬁed as one
sees ﬁt: not treating them as centers of deliberation—i.e. as at least potentially
autonomous agents, who can be (part) authors of their life.39
Considering these various non-standard legislative intentions is, then, a good
way of making determinate, or at least less generic, the idea of (not) treating human
beings as things, and, thus, of seeing under what respects RoL power is opposed to
the manipulation of human beings. Correspondingly, power structures that rely on
the non-standard modes of control on our list prove, in various ways, disrespectful
of the dignity of their subjects (our second condition, section 3).
In acting in these ways, ﬁrst, the lawgiver does not respect the subjects’ status as
potentially autonomous agents (we have just seen this). By acting in these ways,
second, he may positively intend to dismantle, and succeed in dismantling, the self-
esteem of subjects—provided that the latter are disposed, for whatever reason
(section 4.2), to take seriously the lawgiver’s dictates. This is a further way of not
respecting them. And, third, in all these ways, when apparent—to both lawgiver
and subjects or to a third party (cf. section 4.2)—the lawgiver does not respect the
dignity of subjects because, and insofar as, he shows disrespect for them. (One way
of not respecting someone is to show disrespect for him.) The attitude evinced
through the issuing of inconsistent prescriptions may be rendered as “It doesn’t
37 A further hypothesis is that of a “pluralist” lawgiver, who issues conﬂicting prescriptions because
he wants different, conﬂicting values to be pursued by his subjects. (Thanks to M. C. Redondo for
pressing this point on me.) This hypothesis may perhaps be of some interest in accounting for the
conﬂicts engendered by the various rights, principles, and values which make up a substantial part of
the content of contemporary (especially European) constitutions, and of many supranational instru-
ments. I shall not discuss this issue here, and concentrate on the kinds of “strategic” uses of inconsist-
encies, and the power structures building upon them, discussed in the text.
38 A special case, by no means a marginal one, are “double binds,” generated, within deep or
standing personal relationships, by the repeated occurrence of conﬂicting directives of different levels of
abstraction. J. Elster (in (1993: 81); see also (1983: 60ff.)) discusses “contradictory injunctions,” such
as “Don’t be so obedient!” or “Be spontaneous!:” their “overt content” “contradicts their pragmatic
presuppositions;” they thus place subjects “in an impossible situation,” requiring of them “an impos-
sible undertaking.”
39 Cf. for this characterization of autonomy Raz (1986: 369).
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matter what you may think you should do. Calculations are useless.40 I can do
whatever I want of you;”41 and “I don’t care about what you may think I think,
believe, or will. I am free from any discoursive obligation toward you” (“You may
think you are somebody worth talking to, but you are not”). Such messages show
disrespect for those to whom they are addressed,42 and may work as tools in
demolishing their self-esteem.
These are different, cumulable, and mutually reinforcing ways of not respecting
the status of human beings as at least potentially autonomous centers of deliber-
ation and agency. It is in this way that the non-standard modes of guidance on our
list prove disrespectful of the dignity of subjects.
4.2. Compliability (the technology of guilt)
The requirement of compliability may be understood in various ways, according to
how we understand the idea that it should be “possible” to perform the required act
(or, to forbear from acting in the relevant way). So, for instance, the principle may
be understood as imposing the condition that the required act should be logically,
or conceptually possible (thereby ruling out, for example, the injunction to draw a
square circle, and the like). Here, as usual in the literature, I shall understand the
principle as requiring the prescribed acts (or omissions) to be “humanly possible”—
i.e. as requiring them to be, in addition to being logically or conceptually possible,
and physically possible, acts whose performance is generally within the scope of the
abilities and capacities of normal (whatever this may mean) human beings.43
The principle “ought” implies “can,” I assume, is not a logical principle: it is not
logically inconsistent to claim that Xs ought to do A, although they cannot do
A (the former claim does not entail the negation of the latter). Relating to the
ﬁeld of prescriptive discourse, it expresses, however, a conceptual constraint:
prescriptions ﬂouting this constraint are abuses of the institution, parasitical on
the normal or standard case. This, once again, should be understood in the sense
that conforming to the principle is a matter of rational law-giving.44 “Rational”—
instrumentally rational—with respect to a certain purpose: the purpose of standard
guidance. Typically, understanding an utterance as a prescription involves the
ascription, to the utterer, of a normal legislative intention (a defeasible presump-
tion; section 4.1): whoever prescribes to X that he should do A wants X to do A,
and he wants to make X do A. This is why prescribing to X the performance of A,
and at once openly admitting that A is, for human beings, impossible, defeats the
40 On this, see section 6, sub (2).
41 Not caring about consistency is a sign, and an intimation, of unlimited power. Cf. for a parallel
point about compliability Fuller (1969: 70–1).
42 Cf. Marmor (2004: 32) making a parallel point about compliability.
43 Thus, what is claimed is not that laws should be tailored to suit individual capacities and abilities.
The inference from “cannot” to “therefore, he is under no obligation of doing it” does not hold, when
the “cannot” is due to individual peculiarities. Cf. Hart (1961: 174); Kramer (2007: 130, 166). Rules
are addressed to “normal” (whatever this may mean) subjects.
44 Cf. the discussion in von Wright (1963: ch. 7, especially 119, 122), to which I am strongly
indebted here. Cf. also von Wright (1985: 269).
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prescription. It would be irrational to want somebody do something—and to try to
make her do it—if one believed it to be impossible.
So, let us ask ourselves, as we did in the preceding section, what kind of power
may be served by ﬂouting the compliability condition, and why such forms of
power may turn out to be of a “manipulative” kind, and not respect the dignity of
their subjects.
The answers to these questions are, in fact, the same as in the case of the
consistency condition. This is no surprise, since inconsistency, as deﬁned here
(section 4.1), is a special case of non-compliability: inconsistent directives cannot
be jointly followed (ﬁrst case) or anyway satisﬁed (second case). The features
indicated in the preceding section as making power manipulative, and disrespectful,
in the case of inconsistent prescriptions, are, in fact, features that apply to non-
compliable prescriptions generally. The list of the reasons making instrumentally
rational the violation of the requirement—non-standard legislative intentions—
may, however, be enriched. To those listed in section 4.1 we may add the following
two items.
(1) The lawgiver may want to put on trial the subject’s disposition to obedience,
or deference to his authority.
(2) He may wish to make her try to perform the (apparently) required act. This
may happen either because he wants the subject to succeed in the assigned
task to the (by hypothesis partial) extent that she can,45 or because he wants
her to fail. And this, once again, may engender frustration, anxiety, etc.46
One especially important possibility is that of pursuing the strategy of prescribing
the impossible in order to make the addressees feel guilty. Systematically ﬂouting
the compliability requirement may be a way of inducing in the subject the sense of
his inadequacy, and weakness, and of making him feel guilty about that (we may
call this the “technology of guilt”). Logical impossibility (due to inconsistency, or to
other forms of conceptual impossibility) may be a way of achieving this, but, if
we assume the relevant logical relations to be evident to the subject’s eye, and to
be common knowledge among lawgiver and subject, this way of pursuing the
strategy may require too much by way of irrationality on the part of subjects.
Generic non-compliability—prescribing what is (though logically possible) not
humanly possible—is a much more efﬁcacious method (not least because, as
remarked by Fuller,47 the line between what is and what is not humanly possible
is often uncertain). One way of acquiring and exercising power over human beings
is by inducing in them guilt for their (purported) constitutive inadequacy, or
45 Fuller (1969: 71).
46 Non-compliable directives may also be rational in the light of further ends, other than the
guidance, be it standard or non-standard, of human conduct. So, for instance, if one takes the function
of law to be that of providing the resolution of disputes, unfulﬁllable demands may be perfectly in
order. Kramer (1999: 46–7); (2007: 131). Further, the imposition of strict liability involves a violation
of the principle “ought” implies “can.” Thus, whatever reasons may, in some contexts, make it rational
to impose strict liability, make it rational to issue unfulﬁllable directives.
47 Fuller (1969: 79).
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weakness, and setting ourselves as their healers, because we are uniquely authorized
to guarantee them forgiveness for their faults, or because we know how, and are able
to, supplement them in their inadequacy or weakness (we have to manage to make
them believe this, of course; believing it ourselves may help). And one way of doing
this is by issuing prescriptions we know they will not be able to comply with—
setting a standard we know they will not be capable of living up to. That is, we can
do it by ﬂouting the requirement that whoever prescribes wants the addressee do
what he prescribes her to do, and tries, by issuing the prescription, to make her
perform the desired action. In such cases, we do not actually want the addressees to
do what we (seem to) require of them; rather, we want them to fail. It is thanks
to their expected failure that we (mean to) acquire and exercise power (by prescrip-
tions, or any other means) over them. In this way, guidance—non-standard
guidance—may be enabled by non-compliable directives.48
This is the place to introduce, and discuss brieﬂy, a complication implicit in
what has been said already (and which may have perplexed the reader in the
preceding paragraph). It concerns the import of both requirements, compliability
and consistency. The issue is what may be termed the “epistemic dimension” of the
requirements—and of the RoL generally. When we say that the RoL requires
compliability, do we mean that the relevant directives should simply be compliable
(no matter what the parties believe thereabout), or that they should be (perhaps
mistakenly) believed (by both lawgiver and addressee?), or even known to be
fulﬁllable?49
There are various possibilities; and, correspondingly, different versions of the
compliability condition. I consider only some of them, those that seem to me
signiﬁcant re our main issue, “law as power.”
The action prescribed, A, may, unknown to the parties, in fact be impossible, or
it may be believed, either truly or falsely, to be impossible. The former hypothesis,
it seems to me, is, for our purposes, uninteresting.
The hypothesis that A is falsely believed to be impossible does not, it seems to
me, bear peculiar implications, apart from the fact that it may happen that A is in
fact performed, and thus discovered, ex post (contrary to what was previously
believed), to be possible. Let us consider, then, the hypothesis that A is truly
believed to be impossible. We can further distinguish three sub-hypotheses,
according to who believes this, either the lawgiver, or the addressee, or both. In
the ﬁrst of these, issuing a prescription may be a way of making the addressee try to
perform A, fail, and (provided that, for whatever reason, the addressee is disposed to
take the lawgiver’s dictates seriously) of engendering frustration, or guilt.
Suppose now that both the lawgiver and the addressee believe A to be impossible.
We can further distinguish two possible scenarios. The fact that A is impossible
48 J. Elster (1993: 81) mentions, as an example of orders that require from subjects “an impossible
undertaking,” orders that require “willing what cannot be willed” (“Forget it!,” “Don’t even think
about that!”). Elster remarks that such orders, “if taken seriously,”may engender “pervasive guilt.” The
technology of guilt works at its best when the relevant directives concern such internal states as
believing, desiring, and feeling (“Love Big Brother!”). Cf. also Elster (1983: 60ff.).
49 I shall only discuss compliability, but the discussion also applies, mutatis mutandis, to consistency.
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may be common knowledge among lawgiver and addressee (it is out in the open
between them that A is impossible), or not (each one of them believes A to be
impossible, but does not believe the other to believe this).50 In the former case,
prescribing the impossible may be a way of overtly showing disrespect, and (once
again, provided that, for whatever reason, the addressee is disposed to take the
lawgiver’s dictates seriously) of humiliating the addressee, or of demolishing his self-
esteem (“You are not even worthy of a compliable prescription”).51
Often, as remarked, the distinction between what is and what is not humanly
possible will be uncertain (to the lawgiver, to the addressee, to both . . . ). This may
give rise to a vast array of epistemic nuances in the technology of guilt. Generally
speaking, it seems to me, the relevant epistemic and, generally, intentional frame-
work may be largely indeterminate, inchoate, untidy, muddled, even incoherent—
consisting of more or less rational epistemic attitudes and dispositions of the parties
involved (speciﬁcally, dispositions of deference toward the lawgiver, on the part of
the subjects).52 Within a pathological parental relation, for example, a child may
feel guilt, or lose his self-esteem, for not complying with prescriptions commonly
known, by her and her parent, to be unfulﬁllable (and, maybe, issued with that
purpose). On the other hand, irrational lawgivers may well want subjects do what
they believe to be impossible—and, thus, sincerely set for them standards they
know the subjects will not be capable of living up to.
5. Comments
In principle, then, power can be effectively exercised by systematically ﬂouting our
two requirements. Power structures, in various social settings, may ﬂourish around
areas of inconsistent or non-compliable directives, by relying on their psychological
effects (ranging, as we have seen, from puzzlement to guilt).53
A Foucaultian remark may further clarify this. According to Foucault, writes
John Scott, “any form of power, other than mere force or physical repression,
depends on the formation of individuals into subjects with appropriate motives and
desires.”54 Power both requires, and brings about, “subjectivation.” Speciﬁcally,
both inconsistency and uncompliability may be means of constituting subjects apt
for subjection to (non-RoL) power. Systematically ﬂouting our two requirements
50 Common knowledge involves an indeﬁnite series of epistemic iterations. It is common know-
ledge that p among X and Y when X knows that p, Y knows that p, X knows that Y knows that p,
Y knows that X knows that p, X knows that Y knows that X knows that p, and so on. For reﬁnements
and details cf. Celano (2011: section 5). But, it seems to me, if we stop short of common knowledge
there is no reason to go beyond the ﬁrst iteration in the present context.
51 Cf. Fuller (1969: 71, 162).
52 On this cf. also section 6, sub (3).
53 A form of power that may usefully resort to these strategies is what M. Foucault (1981) calls
“pastoral power:” power exercised over human beings on the model of the shepherd’s leading of his
ﬂock.
54 Scott (2001: 92).
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does not bring about speciﬁc motives, beliefs, or attitudes. It may, however, be
useful in inducing or reinforcing a generic habit of submission and docility.
It is not necessary that the strategy be intentional. As we have seen (section 4.2)
the epistemic and, generally, intentional dimension of non-standard guidance may
be indeterminate, inchoate, untidy, incoherent, both on the part of the subjects,
and on the part of lawgivers. It may be enough that the relevant directives are, and
are more or less confusedly perceived as being, unfulﬁllable or inconsistent, that
the effects are those described (ranging from puzzlement to guilt or fear), and that
these effects feed back on the guidance structure, providing for its maintenance.
The whole process may go on without anybody intentionally practicing a strategic
use of non-compliable or inconsistent legislation—or, speciﬁcally, of the technol-
ogy of guilt.
So, the issuing of non-compliable or inconsistent directives can both be strategies
for gaining a secure hold on subjects: ways of laying down the foundations of
robust power structures. Not, however, respectful ways. Rather, they can be ways of
forcing subjects in a no-way-out situation (and, thus, of suspending their agency),
of dismantling their self-esteem, of showing disrespect for them, in order to make it
easier to guide them (by whatever means may be conducive to the end) in the
desired direction. When effective in making the subjects docile to guidance, power
structures of this sort may well be characterized as manipulative. Subjects are not
treated as agents, but as things to be pushed or modiﬁed according to the power-
holder’s will. And, in so manipulating subjects, non-standard guidance, as I have
characterized it here (through nonconformity with our two requirements), falls
below the threshold of a minimum of respect for human dignity.
6. Rule of Law power: some central features
The two RoL requirements we have considered illustrate a threefold conclusion:
RoL power is public, rational, non-paternalistic.55
(1) We have considered the possibility of power structures built around the
systematic ﬂouting of the requirements of consistency or compliability. In both
cases, typically, power is non-public, in this sense: the power-holder keeps hidden
something which is essential for the intended workings of the power structure—
namely, the reason why he is issuing inconsistent or non-compliable directives
(in order to punish the subject no matter how she will act; or, in order to induce
feelings of guilt, etc.). If that were to become public, the power structure would
cease to work. Power exercised by ﬂouting the two requirements is liable to be
“unmasked.”
55 These features are grounded, in different ways, in all the RoL desiderata, and how they work
together. Here, we consider them only to the extent that their instantiation is illustrated by the two
desiderata (satisfying the two desiderata is not, however, a sufﬁcient condition; see n. 24).
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The RoL is, in this sense, publicly exercised power: the power structure works, if
and to the extent that the subject understands that, and how, it is working. This
understanding is part of the power structure itself.
In other words, RoL power may be characterized as “public” in the following
sense: the strategies and forms of power which systematically resort to inconsistent
or non-compliable directives are, typically, secret: their explicit avowal would refute
them, both in the sense of making them inefﬁcacious, and in the sense of showing
them to be disreputable. In such “secret” power structures, inconsistent, or non-
compliable, directives are useful, only so long as it is not publicly known why they
are issued.56
Thus (or at least this is the pro tanto conclusion the examination of our two
desiderata leads us to), RoL power works through the understanding, by the
subject, of its workings: the subject understands that something is required, and
what is required, of her, and this understanding is a necessary condition for the kind
of guidance intended—for her doing what she is intended to do, in the way she is
intended to do it.
I conclude that, to the extent that it satisﬁes our two desiderata, the law is, pro
tanto, a method of social control that works openly and publicly in the production
of the desired behavior. Its mode of operation is such that it has to stand out in the
open for it to work in the intended way.
(2) As we have seen (section 4), power exercised by ﬂouting the two require-
ments can be instrumentally rational. It all depends on what the (non-standard)
purpose of the lawgiver is. There is, however, a speciﬁc respect under which RoL
power is rational power: it is power for rational subjects. Speciﬁcally, I shall now
argue, power exercised by complying with our two requirements is power for
rational people.
Think of the attitude which may be expressed by the issuing of inconsistent
prescriptions: “It doesn’t matter what you may think you should do, calculations—
or the weighing of reasons for and against alternative courses of action—are useless.
What will happen to you does not depend on your deliberation.” Guidance
through the issuing of prescriptions, when it is standard guidance, is a rational
mode of guidance, in this sense: it is a method of control which relies on—and, in
the ﬁrst instance, leaves room for—the subject’s calculations and deliberation. The
issuing of inconsistent prescriptions, for the purposes of some form of non-standard
guidance, suspends this. The addressee is not being treated as a rational (calculat-
ing, reasons-weighing, deliberating) agent anymore.
The same holds in the case of non-compliability, where this is an instrument for
non-standard guidance. When non-compliability is common knowledge among
56 Publicity, as I have said (section 2), is usually listed as a further RoL requirement. Are we
conﬂating different phenomena, blurring conceptual distinctions? No, for two reasons. (1) What the
RoL requires is publicity of the laws. Here, we are considering publicity as a property of the way in
which laws conforming to the RoL inﬂuence the subjects’ behavior. (2) Different RoL requirements are
interconnected, in various ways (so, for instance, prospectivity, intelligibility, and publicity are, in the
RoL, mutually related features). So, it is no surprise that consistency and compliability should point to
a facet of the ideal of publicity. Further aspects of this ideal are sorted out in Celano (2011).
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the parties, the attitude expressed by the lawgiver is very similar: “You are not
worthy of being told what you are supposed to do. Your fate does not depend on
your understanding or deliberation.” When the issuing of non-compliable direct-
ives is an—undisclosed—way of making the subject try to perform the (apparently)
required action, or of inducing feelings of inadequacy and guilt, the subject is, once
again, not being treated as a rational agent.
This leads us to an important point, which has surfaced already at times (sections
4.2, 5), but is worth emphasizing. I have summarily described some non-standard
forms of guidance through the issuing of prescriptions, built upon the violation of
our two RoL requirements. It is important to note that power structures of this
kind may rely, for their efﬁcacy and operation, on irrational attitudes and on
fallacious inferences on the part of the subjects. To take two extreme cases, it is
(barring, perhaps, far-fetched scenarios) a wholly irrational reaction to lose one’s
self-esteem in the face of inconsistent directives, or to feel guilt for not complying
with patently non-compliable prescriptions. Both attitudes may be the upshot
of unconscious drives, misplaced affections, unwarranted fears, or any sort of
irrational attitude. Power structures relying on these sorts of psychic mechanisms
are no less real for that.
Thus—and this is an important methodological point—when we consider the
RoL as a speciﬁc mode of power, and when we try to grasp what its features are by
contrasting it with other varieties of power, it is not only power as effective in
controlling rational subjects that we have to contrast it with. There is no reason to
exclude from the comparison forms of (non-standard) guidance that rely on the
irrationality of subjects.
When seen in the light of these possibilities, RoL power—speciﬁcally, power
conforming to our two requirements—looks, in a sense, quite naive: X tells Y to do
A, and announces to Y what the consequences of non-compliance will be, in the
expectation that Y will ponder whether to comply or not. It is in this, minimal,
sense that RoL guidance—as illustrated by our two requirements—is guidance for
rational subjects.57
(3) From what has just been said about RoL power as power for rational subjects
it follows that RoL guidance, as illustrated by a power structure that meets our two
requirements, is non-paternalistic. Not in the sense (the focal sense of “paternalis-
tic”) that it rules out interference—or, speciﬁcally, coercive interference—in the
activities of subjects in order to promote their own good. Laws conforming to
the RoL desiderata may well be paternalistic in this sense. It is, rather, a matter of
the kind of attitude expressed in the exercise of RoL power.
When the government treats its subjects in accordance with the RoL, it treats
them as adults, capable of making their own decisions on the basis of their
own preferences and their own understanding of the relevant facts. It tells them
57 Cf. Raz (1979: 222): “a legal system which does in general observe the rule of law . . . attempts to
guide [people’s] behaviour through affecting the circumstances of their action. It thus presupposes that
they are rational . . . creatures and attempts to affect their actions and habits by affecting their deliber-
ations.”
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explicitly “I want you to behave in such and such a way; these will be the
consequences—I shall inﬂict you such and such a harm—in case you don’t; now
it’s up to you.”
This mode of exercising power over a human being should be contrasted with
the way in which children are often treated. In order to make children do what we
want them to do we sometimes tell them lies (“Candy shops are closed now”); we
fake non-existing unpleasant consequences (“The wolf will come and get you”); in
various ways, we distort reality. Or we try, unknown to them, directly to manipu-
late the environment, or their preferences, by working behind their back, so to
speak. Or, again, we rely, in trying to make them do what we want them to do, on
an aura of parental authority, or on symbols. In acting in these ways, we do not
recognize to children the dignity of responsible agents, capable of autonomous
choice; we do not treat them as autonomous agents capable of—and entitled to—
making their own choices on the basis of preferences and beliefs which are in fact
their own. It is characteristic of standard guidance through prescriptions—thus, of
RoL power—that it gives the subject a choice—albeit, often, a forced one.58
Furthermore, in a prescriptive relationship the subject to whom a prescription is
addressed is kept at a distance, so to speak. She is not regarded by the lawgiver as an
appendix to, or an extension of, his own body, as merely a tool, or as one
commodity among others at his disposal, or again as something in the environment
to be manipulated (be it in view of its own good). Causal efﬁcacy on her conduct is
mediated by her own understanding of its being exerted, and how (cf. in this
section, sub (1))—and this is common knowledge between the two. In this way,
too, RoL power is non-manipulative.
These two features—giving the subject a choice (albeit a forced one) and keeping
her at a distance (in the speciﬁed sense)—render RoL power very different from the
kind of power parents often exercise over their young children, shepherds over the
ﬂock, propaganda experts over their target, etc. It may be said that, if the supreme
achievement of power consists in securing the willing compliance of its subjects,59
it is characteristic of RoL power that it aims at securing unwilling compliance.
Under both respects, one distinctive feature of RoL power is that rulers regard
their subjects, literally, as addressees—i.e. as subjects capable, and worthy, of being
addressed. To borrow a phrase from Strawson, their dealings with them, as
addressees, are not premised on “objectivity of attitude:” a “purely objective view
of the agent as one posing problems simply of intellectual understanding, manage-
ment, treatment and control.”60
58 This should not be taken as holding across the board. Think, for instance, of threats having a
“Your money or your life” structure. These do not in fact offer the subject the choice they apparently
offer her. In case the subject complies, the gunman will get her money. In case she doesn’t, the gunmen
will get both her life and her money. This is, in fact, no (well-formed) alternative. The latter hypothesis
includes the former—they are not logically independent. The real alternative (and the choice) is
between losing or not losing one’s life: one’s money is lost anyway.
59 Lukes (2005: 10–11).
60 Strawson (1962: 87). “To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him,
perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called
treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be
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This is what happens in cases of standard guidance, where (inter alia) our two
requirements are satisﬁed. Things stand differently within power structures
where ﬂouting consistency and compliability may turn out to be instrumentally
rational. Where, for example, pastoral power is being exerted, inconsistent or non-
compliable directives may be good means in the enterprise of leading the subject
in the desired direction, be it his own good. Or, again, in issuing patently non-
compliable directives in order to induce feelings of guilt power-holders are not
treating subjects as addressees (in the speciﬁed sense).
Thus, under all three respects—publicity, rationality, non-paternalism—RoL
power, as illustrated by laws meeting our two requirements, qualiﬁes as a mode of
power which (minimally) ﬁts the dignity of adult, rational, autonomous agents, to
be contrasted with manipulative forms of power.61 When the government treats its
subjects in this way, it recognizes to them the dignity of beings worthy of being
publicly, openly addressed, and of being guided through their understanding of the
way in which power is being exerted over them, and their deliberations on the
merits of the case. In short, it treats them with, and shows them, respect.
This concerns only the form of the relationship, not the laws’ content. It is
compatible with all sorts of disrespect and unjust discrimination. But it positively
is, it seems to me, a valuable feature of laws meeting RoL desiderata.
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